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Abstract—Shake Them All is a popular “Wallpaper” appli-
cation exceeding millions of downloads on Google Play. At
installation, this application is given permission to (1) access
the Internet (for updating wallpapers) and (2) use the device
microphone (to change background following noise changes).
With these permissions, the application could silently record user
conversations and upload them remotely. To give more confidence
about how Shake Them All actually processes what it records, it
is necessary to build a precise analysis tool that tracks the flow
of any sensitive data from its source point to any sink, especially
if those are in different components.
Since Android applications may leak private data carelessly or
maliciously, we propose IccTA, a static taint analyzer to detect
privacy leaks among components in Android applications. IccTA
goes beyond state-of-the-art approaches by supporting inter-
component detection. By propagating context information among
components, IccTA improves the precision of the analysis. IccTA
outperforms existing tools on two benchmarks for ICC-leak
detectors: DroidBench and ICC-Bench. Moreover, our approach
detects 534 ICC leaks in 108 apps from MalGenome and 2,395
ICC leaks in 337 apps in a set of 15,000 Google Play apps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern mobile operating systems have enhanced usage
experience to allow users to easily install third party software.
With the growing momentum of the Android operating system,
thousands of applications (also called apps) emerge every
day on the official Android market (Google Play) as well
as on some alternative markets. As of May 2013, 48 billion
apps have been installed from the Google Play store, and as
of September 3, 2013, 1 billion Android devices have been
activated [1].
The success of the Android OS in its user base as well as in
its developer base can partly be attributed to its communication
model, named Inter-Component Communication (ICC), which
promotes the development of loosely-coupled applications. By
dividing applications into components that can exchange data
within a single application or even across several applications,
Android encourages software reuse, and thus reduces devel-
oper burden.
Unfortunately, the ICC model, which provides a message
passing mechanism for data exchange among components,
can be misused by malicious apps to threaten user privacy.
Indeed, researchers have shown that Android apps frequently
send users private data outside the device without their prior
consent [49]. Those applications are said to leak private
data. Recently, researchers have investigated ICC methods as
features for vulnerability detection [34], in lieu of permissions
and API calls. However, there is still a lack of a comprehensive
study on the characteristics of the usage of ICCs by Android
malware. Typically, what is the extent of the presence of
privacy leaks in Android malware?
To answer such a question, an Android analysis tool has
to be developed for tracking privacy leaks. Although, most
of the privacy leaks are simple, i.e., easily identifiable as
they operate within a single component, there have recently
been reports of cross-components privacy leaks [44]. Thus,
analyzing components separately is not enough to detect leaks:
it is necessary to perform an inter-component analysis of
applications. Android app analysts could leverage such a tool
to identify malicious apps that leak private data. For the tool
to be useful, it has to be highly precise and minimize the false
positive rate when reporting applications leaking private data.
In this paper, we use a static taint analysis technique to find
privacy leaks, e.g., paths from sensitive data, called sources, to
statements sending the data outside the application or device,
called sinks. A path may be within a single component or cross
multiple components. State-of-the-art approaches using static
analysis to detect privacy leaks on Android apps mainly focus
on detecting intra-component sensitive data leaks. CHEX [33],
for example, uses static analysis to detect component hijacking
vulnerabilities by tracking taints between sensitive sources
and sinks. FlowDroid [7] performs taint analysis within single
components of Android applications but with a better preci-
sion. Most recently, Amandroid [44] has been proposed to
detect ICC-based privacy leaks in Android apps. However,
it does not currently tackle Content Provider, one of
the four Android components. It is also not sensitive to
some complicated ICC methods such as bindService and
startActivityForResult.
Thus, we propose IccTA, an Inter-component communica-
tion Taint Analysis tool, for a sound and precise detection of
ICC links and leaks. Although our approach is generic and can
be used for any data-flow analysis, we focus in this paper on
using IccTA to detect ICC-based privacy leaks. To verify our
approach, we developed 22 apps containing ICC-based privacy
leaks. We have added these applications to DroidBench [2], an
open test suite for evaluating the effectiveness and accuracy
of taint analysis tools specifically for Android apps. The 22
apps cover the top 8 used ICC methods illustrated in Table I.
Besides, we test IccTA on 15,000 real-world apps ran-
domly selected from Google Play market in which we detect
2,395 ICC leaks in 337 apps. We also launch IccTA on
the MalGenome set containing 1260 malware, where IccTA
reports 108 apps with 534 ICC leaks. By comparing the
detecting rate r = # of detected apps
# of tested apps
of the two data sets,
we found that rMalGenome = 8.6% is much higher than
rGoogleP lay = 2.2%. Thus, we can conclude that ICC are
significantly used by malware to leak private data, making
ICC a potential feature for malware detection.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present the findings of an empirical study on the use
of ICC in Android malware and benign apps.
• We propose a novel methodology to resolve the ICC
problem by directly connecting the discontinuities of
Android apps at the code level.
• We developed IccTA, an open-source tool for inter-
component taint analysis.
• We provide an improved version of DroidBench with 22
new apps for the assessment of tools which detect ICC-
based privacy leaks.
• Finally, we present an assessment of IccTA using i) the
DroidBench and ICC-Bench test suites, ii) 15,000 real-
world Android applications, iii) 1,260 malware apps from
MalGenome.
We make available online our full implementation as an
open source project, along with the extended DroidBench apps
and the scripts to reproduce our experimental results on
https://sites.google.com/site/icctawebpage/
To better mitigate mobile ICC leaks, we also release the
445 problematic apps (337 from Google Play and 108 from
MalGenome) to the research community at the above website.
II. MOTIVATION
To motivate our work, we present an overview of the
Android ICC system highlighting the implications of its design
and implementation choices in II-A. We further perform an
empirical study of how ICCs are used in Android apps, to
expose the difference of usage between malware and benign
apps (cf. Section II-B). Finally, we give a concrete example
to introduce ICC leaks in Section II-C.
A. Android ICC Overview
An Android application is made up of basic units, called
components, described in a special file, the Manifest, included
in the application package. There are four types of compo-
nents: Activities that represent user interfaces and constitute
the visible part of Android applications; Broadcast Receivers
that wait to receive event messages, such as incoming calls or
text messages, from other components or the system; Content
Providers which act as the standard interface to share struc-
tured data between applications; and Services which execute
(compute-intensive) tasks in the background. Android Service
components are particular, as their processing is hidden to
the device user, opening numerous opportunities for malicious
actions.
Android provides specific methods, hereinafter referred to as
ICC methods, for triggering inter-component communications
among any combinations of the above components. ICC meth-
ods take as parameter a special kind of object, called Intent,
which specifies the target component(s) for the message.
All ICC methods1 are called with at least one Intent object
as an argument. To facilitate the use, by some apps, of
existing features provided by other apps, Android allows to
target components by specifying in the Intent an action to
handle. Such Intents are known as implicit Intents. When
an implicit Intent is used, e.g., for Activities, the system
searches in the installed applications and presents the user
with a list of applications capable of handling the action
(e.g., choose a browser to open a url). These Intents may
also specify categories, a mimetype and data for the target
components. In order to be selected for receiving the implicit
Intents, applications containing the target components need to
specify an Intent Filter in their manifest file, declaring their
capabilities to process such Intents.
Android, however, offers the possibility for components to
directly interact with each other. One component can thus send
an Intent to another by naming it explicitly. These are known
as explicit Intents.
B. ICC Usage in Android Apps
To the best of our knowledge there have been no empirical
investigation of the usage of ICC in Android apps. Yet, given
the importance of ICC in the Android development model, as
well as its potential correlation with malware functioning as
introduced above, a thorough study on real-world apps can
provide answers to the following important questions:
How often are ICCs used in Android apps? This question will
lead to the investigation of the extent to which each of the
different ICC methods are used in apps, and what types of
components they are targeting.
What kind of Intents are used for ICC in apps? This question
is important to estimate the differences in the instantiations of
implicit Intents and explicit Intents.
Is the usage of ICC different between malware and benign
apps? Investigating this question may open directions for
malware detection research, which seeks reliable app features
to use in machine-learning processes.
Datasets: We attempt to provide answers to the questions
above, using two distinct datasets of over one thousand ap-
plications each.
The first dataset, named MalGenome, includes 1, 023 An-
droid malware samples collected by Zhou et al. [49]. Although
the originally published dataset contains 1, 260 apps, some
of these apps share the same package names, therefore we
consider them as duplicates.
1Except Content Provider related methods such as query or
insert.
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Fig. 1: The comparison between MalGenome and GooglePlay apps. “M” means MalGenome, “G” means GooglePlay, “Ex” means explicit
and “Im” means implicit. (To highlight the difference between median values, we cut off some upper whiskers).
The second dataset, hereafter referred to as GooglePlay, is a
set of 1, 023 Android apps2 randomly selected from the official
Google market.
Results: We now present the findings of our investigation.
1) Prevalence of ICCs in app code: First, we compute the
usage rate of ICC methods. To that end, we parse the app byte
code to count the instances of specific method calls based on
a catalog of ICC method names. This analysis was performed
on all the 1, 023× 2 apps. Table I shows the usage rate of the
ICC method names, separating the top 8 most used, from all
other ICC methods.
TABLE I: The top 8 used ICC methods. When these methods are
overloaded, we consider the one with the most number of calls.
ICC Method # of Calls # of Apps
startActivity 54,334 (56.01%) 1,972 (96.4%)
startActivityForResult 11,118 (11.46%) 1,409 (68.7%)
query 8,191 (8.44%) 1,374 (67.2%)
startService 6,660 (6.86%) 1,597 (78.1%)
sendBroadcast 5,119 (5.28%) 1,035 (50.1%)
insert 2,164 (2.23%) 780 (38.1%)
bindService 1,638 (1.69%) 512 (25.0%)
delete 1,633 (1.69%) 472 (23.1%)
Other ICC Methods 6,155 (6.34%) -
Total 97,012 (100%) -
The # of Calls represents the absolute number of ICC
method calls from the entire two sets. The # of Apps represents
the number of apps using at least once the corresponding
ICC method. 96.4% of the apps in our dataset use the
startActivity ICC method, which accounts for 56.01%
of the total ICC methods calls. startActivity is used
to launch a new Activity component, e.g., to switch from
one user interface window to another. The second most used
ICC method is startActivityForResult which also
launches a new Activity component. In this case however,
the flow goes back to the calling component. Then follows
query, an ICC method used to access content providers.
startService, which appears in 78.1% of the apps, is used
to launch a new Service.
2) Number of Intents: Before computing details in the
number of Intents3 in the code of dataset apps, we compare
the sizes of apps across the MalGenome and GooglePlay sets.
2We choose 1, 023 apps to avoid a class imbalance issue.
3In this paper, we do not distinguish the difference between Intents and
ICC methods since basically an Intent is corresponding to an ICC method.
Fig. 1a represents the boxplot4 of the size of the apps for
both sets. The median value for the MalGenome set is 187
KB whereas the median value is 1195 KB for the GooglePlay
set. We ensure that this difference of median sizes between
the datasets is significantly different by performing a Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW). The resulting p-value confirms
that the difference is significant at a significance level5 at
0.001.
To account for any potential bias that the difference of
app sizes between datasets may introduce, we proceed to
normalize all results according to a unit of dex code size.
A normalized result nR is obtained by applying the formula
nR = iR⌈bS÷100K⌉ , where iR is the initial result and bS is the
byte code size.
a) Absolute number of Intents: Fig. 1b represents the
boxplot of the normalised numbers of Intents per apps. The
median number of Intents is 5.5 per 100KB per app for the
MalGenome dataset, and 1.9 for the GooglePlay dataset. The
MWW test again shows that this difference is statistically
significant.
Malicious applications manipulate significantly more
Intents than benign apps
b) Number of Intents vs Component types: We further
investigate the difference of number of Intents per app in
the two datasets by comparing the usage of Intents for ICC
exchange with specific types of components. Fig. 1c shows
the boxplot of number of Intents used to launch an Activity
(left two) and a Service (right two). The median values are
respectively 3.50 and 0.50 for the MalGenome dataset, and
1.48 and 0.00 for the GooglePlay dataset.
c) Explicit Intents vs Implicit Intents: Table II provides
comparison data on the proportion of implicit and explicit In-
tents among the overall numbers of Intents. In the MalGenome
set, 27,278 Intents in total are found, where 14,034 (51.4%) are
explicit Intents. In the Google Play set, however, only 40.1%
(22,955 out of 56,213) of the Intents are explicit Intents.
Fig. 1d presents boxplots detailing the normalised number
of implicit and explicit Intents for both Activity and Service.
The median values between the MalGenome dataset and the
4We use the R tool to draw the boxplot. Each boxplot contains five main
horizontal lines. From top to bottom: MAXIMUM (i.e., the greatest value,
excluding outliers), UPPER QUARTILE (25% of data points are above this
line), MEDIAN, LOWER QUARTILE and MINIMUM.
5Given a significance level α = 0.001, if p-value < α, there is one chance
in a thousand that the difference between the datasets is due to a coincidence.
TABLE II: Comparison of the use of Intents in the data sets.
Dataset Activity Service Receiver Total
(expl./impl.) (expl./impl.) (expl./impl.) (expl./impl.)
MalGenome 8803/9569 5204/422 27/3253 14034/13244
Google Play 20018/30461 2715/828 222/1969 22955/ 33258
GooglePlay dataset are close in the case of implicit Intents.
On the other hand, there is a larger difference for explicit
Intents. We further confirm that this difference is statistically
significant via the MWW test, using a significance level of
α = 0.0001.
Malicious applications tend to use more explicit Intents
than benign apps.
This empirical investigation of ICC in malware and benign
apps highlights the importance of ICC in the context of
Android app security management. In particular, the focus of
this study has demonstrated that some Android properties, e.g.,
possibility to explicitly target a component, thus bypassing
user’s choice, are exploited by malicious apps. Such apps can
indeed leak private data across components. After presenting
our approach for detecting leaks that are related to ICC,
we will perform a final experiment to investigate whether
there is a correlation between the number of Intents and the
number of ICC leaks. A positive correlation will thus provide
confirmation that ICC can be explored as a feature for malware
detection.
C. ICC leaks
We define a privacy leak as a path from sensitive data,
called source, to statements sending this data outside the
application or device, called sink. A path may be within a
single component or across multiple components. In this paper,
the sources and sinks we use are provided by SUSI [38].
1 //TelephonyManager telMnger; (default)
2 //SmsManager sms; (default)
3 class Activity1 extends Activity {
4 void onCreate(Bundle state) {
5 Button to2 = (Button) findViewById(to2a);
6 to2.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener(){
7 void onClick(View v) {
8 String id = telMnger.getDeviceId();
9 Intent i = new
Intent(Activity1.this,Activity2.class);
10 i.putExtra("sensitive", id);
11 Activity1.this.startActivity(i);
12 }});}}
13 class Activity2 extends Activity {
14 void onStart() {
15 Intent i = getIntent();
16 String s = i.getStringExtra("sensitive");
17 sms.sendTextMessage(number,null,s,null,null);
18 }}
Listing 1: A Running Example.
Listing 1 illustrates the concept of ICC leak through a
concrete example. The code snippets present two Activi-
ties: Activity1 and Activity2. Activity1 registers an
anonymous button listener for the to2 button (lines 5-11). An
ICC method startActivity is used by this anonymous
listener. When button to2 is clicked, the onClick method is
executed and the user interface will change to Activity2.
An Intent containing the device ID (lines 15), considered as
sensitive data, is then exchanged between the two components
by first attaching the data to the Intent with the putExtra
method (lines 10) and then by invoking the ICC method
startActivity (lines 11). Note that the Intent is created
by explicitly specifying the target class (Activity2).
In this example, sendTextMessage is systematically
executed when Activity2 is loaded since onStart is in
the execution lifecycle of an Activity. The data retrieved
from the Intent is thus sent as a SMS message to the spec-
ified phone number: there is an ICC leak triggered by button
to2. When to2 is clicked, the device ID is transferred from
Activity1 to Activity2 and then outside the application.
In this paper, we aim to perform static taint analysis for
Android apps to detect such inter-component communication
(ICC) based privacy leaks. In static taint analysis, a leak k
corresponds to a sequence of statements, which starts from
a source s and ends with a sink d. Sources are identified as
they return private data from the user’s point of view into the
application code, while Sinks are identified as they send data
out of the application. An ICC leak is a special leak which
contains, in its statement sequence, at least one ICC method.
Normally, C(s) 6= C(d), where C(s) means the component of
method s. But in some cases, C(s) can equal to C(d). Take
ICC method startActivityForResult as an example,
component C1 can use this method to start a component C2
(in method m1). Once C2 finishes running, C1 runs again (in
method m2) with some result data returned from C2. An ICC
leak may occur as m1 → C2 → m2 but in this situation
C(m1) == C(m2).
III. OUR APPROACH
In this section, we introduce in Section III-A the specificity
of Android apps that makes statically analyzing them difficult.
Then, we present an overview of our tool called IccTA, which
is designed to detect ICC leaks in Section III-B. IccTA uses
a two-step approach: 1) ICC links extraction; 2) Taint flow
analysis for ICC. Sections III-C and III-D detail these two
steps respectively.
A. Static Analysis for Android is Difficult
Despite the fact that Android apps are mainly programmed
in Java, off-the-shelf static taint analysis tools for Java do not
work on Android applications. Static Analyzers for Android
need to be adapted mainly for three reasons.
The first reason is that, as already mentioned, Android ap-
plications are made of components. Communications between
components involve Intent Filter and Intent. The dynamic
resolution done by the Android system to match Intent Filter
and Intent induces a discontinuity in the control-flow of An-
droid applications. This specificity makes static taint analysis
challenging by requiring pre-processing of the code to resolve
links between components. Take Listing 1 as an example,
analysis tools need to be able to find the link from ICC
method startActivity to Activity2 and to be able
to propagate the Intent i in line 11 to method getIntent
in line 15.
The second reason is related to the user-centric nature
of Android applications, in which a user can interact a lot
through the touch screen. The management of user inputs is
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Fig. 2: Overview of IccTA.
mainly done by handling specific callback methods such as
the onClick (line 7 in Listing 1) method which is called when
the user clicks on a button. Static analysis requires a precise
model that simulates users’ behaviors.
The third and last reason is related to the lifecycle man-
agement of the components. There is no main method as
in a traditional Java program. Instead, the Android system
switches between states of a component’s lifecycle by calling
callback methods such as onStart or onResume. However,
these lifecycle methods are not directly connected in the
code. Modeling the Android system allows to connect callback
methods to the rest of the code.
B. IccTA Overview
Fig. 2 shows the overview of IccTA, our open source tool
to detect ICC leaks. Even if Android apps are implemented
in Java, an app is compiled into Dalvik bytecode instead
of the traditional Java bytecode. In a first step, IccTA uses
Dexpler [11] to transform this Dalvik bytecode into Jimple,
a Soot’s internal representation [28]. Soot is a popular frame-
work to analyze Java based apps. In the second step (arrows
2.∗), IccTA extracts the ICC links, and in step 3, stores them
as well as all the collected data (e.g., ICC call parameters
or Intent Filter values) into a database. Based on the ICC
links, in step 4.1, IccTA modifies the Jimple representation to
directly connect the components to enable data-flow analysis
between components. In step 4.2, by using a modified version
of FlowDroid [7], a high precise intra-component taint analysis
tool for Android apps, IccTA builds a complete control-
flow graph of the whole Android application. This allows
propagating the context (e.g., the value of Intents) between
Android components and yielding a highly precise data-flow
analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach
that precisely connects components for data-flow analysis. At
last (step 5), IccTA stores the reported tainted paths (leaks)
into database.
In both steps (3) and (5), we store all the results including
the ICC methods with their attribute values such as URI and
Intent, the target components with their Intent Filter values,
the built ICC links and the reported ICC leaks into a database.
This allows to only analyze an app once, and then reuse the
results from the database.
In the next two sections, we detail the main technical
contributions of IccTA, which lie in steps 2 and 4.
// modifications of Activity1
- Activity1.this.startActivity(i);
+ IpcSC.redirect0(i);
(A)
// creation of a helper class
+class IpcSC {
+ static void redirect0(Intent i) {
+ Activity2 a2 = new Activity2(i);
+ a2.dummyMain();
+ }
+}
(B)
// modifications in Activity2
+public Activity2(Intent i) {
+ this.intent_for_ipc = i;
+}
public Intent getIntent() {
+ return this.intent_for_ipc;
}
+public void dummyMain() {
+ // lifecycle and callbacks
+ // are called here
+}
(C)
Fig. 3: Handling startActivity ICC method.
C. ICC links extraction
In this section, we detail our approach to extract the ICC
links of the analyzed apps. An ICC link l : m→ C is used to
link two components in which the source component contains
an ICC method m that holds information (e.g., the class
name for an explicit Intent or the action, category, mimetype,
. . . information for an implicit Intent) to access the target
component C.
As shown in Fig. 2, IccTA uses three steps to extract
the ICC links from an app. In step (2.1), IccTA leverages
Epicc [37] to obtain the ICC methods and their parameters
(e.g., action of Intents). Epicc is a tool, based on Soot and
Heros [13], to identify ICC methods as well as their parameter
values (e.g., action, category). In IccTA, we use IC3 [36],
an advanced tool that implements the idea of Epicc, to also
parse the URIs (e.g., scheme, host) to support Content
Provider related ICC methods (e.g., query) and to fully
support the data field of Intents. In step (2.2), IccTA identifies
all the possible target components by parsing the configuration
file named AndroidManifest of an app to retrieve the
values of the Intent Filters. In some situations, analyzing the
bytecode is also necessary since Broadcast Receiver
can be registered at runtime. In step (2.3), we match ICC
methods with their target components, i.e., the Intents with
Intent Filters, through the rules introduced by the Android
documentation [4].
D. Taint Flow Analysis for ICC
In this section, we detail our instrumentation approach to
perform taint flow analysis for ICC. As detailed in Sec-
tion III-A, there are three types of discontinuities in Android:
(1) ICC methods, (2) lifecycle methods and (3) callback
methods. We first describe how IccTA tackles ICC methods in
Section III-D1. Then, we detail how IccTA resolves lifecycle
and callback methods in Section III-D2.
1) ICC Methods: In step (4.1) of Fig. 2, the Jimple code
is instrumented by IccTA to connect components. This code
modification is required for all ICC methods (listed in Table
I). The main idea of the transformation is to replace an ICC
method call with an instantiation of the target component
with the appropriate Intent. We detail these modifications
for the two most used ICC methods: startActivity and
startActivityForResult. We handle ICC methods for
Services and Broadcast Receivers in a similar way.
StartActivity. Fig. 3 shows the code transfor-
mation done by IccTA for the ICC link between
Activity1 and Activity2 of our running example.
IccTA first creates a helper class named IpcSC (B in Fig. 3)
which acts as a bridge connecting the source and destination
components. Then, the startActivity ICC method is
removed and replaced by a statement calling the generated
helper method (redirect0) (A).
In (C), IccTA generates a constructor method taking an
Intent as parameter, a dummyMain method to call all
related methods of the component (i.e., lifecycle and callback
methods) and overrides the getIntent method. An Intent is
transferred by the Android system from the caller component
to the callee component. We model the behavior of the
Android system by explicitly transferring the Intent to the
destination component using a customized constructor method,
Activity2(Intent i), which takes an Intent as its
parameter and stores the Intent to a newly generated field
intent_for_ipc. The original getIntent method asks
the Android system for the incoming Intent object. The new
getIntent method models the Android system behavior
by returning the Intent object given as parameter to the new
constructor method.
The helper method redirect0 constructs an object of
type Activity2 (the target component) and initializes the
new object with the Intent given as parameter to the
helper method. Then, it calls the dummyMain method of
Activity2.
To resolve the target component, i.e., to automatically infer
what is the type that has to be used in the method redirect0
(in our example, to infer Activity2), IccTA uses the ICC
links stored in step (3) in which not only the explicit Intents
but also the implicit Intents are resolved. Therefore, there is
no difference for IccTA to handle explicit or implicit Intents
based ICCs.
StartActivityForResult. A component C1 can use this
method to start a component C2. Once C2 finishes run-
ning, C1 runs again with some result data returned
from C2. Fig. 4 shows the control-flow mechanism of
startActivityForResult ICC method. There are two
discontinuities: one from (1) to (2), similar to the discontinuity
of the startActivity method, and the other from (3) to
(4).
The startActivityForResult ICC method has a
more complex semantic compared to common ICC methods
that only trigger one-way communication between components
(e.g., startActivity). Fig. 5 shows how the code is
instrumented to handle the startActivityForResult
method for Fig. 4. To stay consistent with common ICC
methods, we do not instrument the finish method of C2
to call onActivityResult method. Instead, we generate a
field intent_for_ar to store the Intent which will be trans-
ferred back to C1. The Intent that will be transferred back is
set by the setResult method. We override the setResult
method to store the value of Intent to intent_for_ar. The
helper method IpcSC.redirect0 does two modifications
to link these two components directly. First, it calls the
dummyMain method of the destination component. Then,
it calls the onActivityResult method of the source
component.
- act.startActivityForResult(i);
+ IpcSC.redirect0(act, i);
(A)
void setResult(Intent i) {
+ this.intent_for_ar = i;
}
+public Intent getIntentFAR() {
+ return this.intent_for_ar;
+}
(C)
+class IpcSC {
+ static void redirect0(C1 c1,
+ Intent i){
+ C2 c2 = new C2(i);
+ c2.dummyMain();
+ Intent retI = c2.getIntentFAR();
+ c1.onActivityResult(retI);
+ }
+}
(B)
Fig. 5: Handing the startActivityForResult ICC method.
(A) and (C) represents the modified code of C1 and C2 respectively.
(B) is the glue code connecting C1 and C2. Some method parameters
are not represented to simplify the code.
Android
System
C1 Entry Point
startActivityForResult
onActivityResult
C2 Entry Point
setResult
ﬁnish
C1 C2
(4) (3)
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Fig. 4: The control-flow of startActivityForResult.
2) Lifecycle and Callback Methods: One challenge when
analyzing Android applications is to tackle the callback meth-
ods and the lifecycle methods of components. An introduction
about lifycycle and callback methods can be found in [30].
There is no direct call among those methods in the code of
applications since the Android system handles lifecycles and
callbacks. For callback methods, we need to take care of not
only the methods triggered by the User Interface (UI) events
(e.g., onClick) but also callbacks triggered by Java or the
Android system (e.g., the onCreate method). In Android,
every component has its own lifecycle methods. To solve this
problem, IccTA generates a dummyMain method for each
component in which we model all the methods mentioned
above so that our CFG based approach is aware of them. Note
that FlowDroid also generates a dummyMain method, but it
is generated for the whole app instead of for each component
like we do.
IV. EVALUATION
Our evaluation addresses the following research questions:
RQ1 How does IccTA compare with existing tools?
RQ2 Can IccTA find ICC leaks in real-world apps?
RQ3 What is the runtime performance of IccTA?
All the experiments discussed in this section are performed
on a Core i7 CPU running a Java VM with 8GB of heap size.
A. RQ1: Comparison With Existing Tools
In this research question, we compare IccTA with four
existing tools: FlowDroid [7], IBM AppScan Source 9.0 [3],
DidFail [27] and Amandroid [44]. FlowDroid is a state-of-the-
art open-source tool for intra-component static taint analysis,
AppScan Source is a commercial tool released by IBM, while
DidFail and Amandroid are two recent state-of-the-art tools
for detecting Android ICC leaks. All the tools are able to
directly analyze Android bytecode except AppScan Source,
which is only able to analyze the source code of the apps.
Unfortunately, we were unable to compare IccTA with other
static taint analysis tools as either they fail to report any leaks
(e.g., SCanDroid [21]) or their authors did not make them
available (e.g., SEFA [45]).
1) Experimental Setup: We assess the efficacy of all afore-
mentioned tools by running them against about 30 test cases,
for ICC leaks, from two benchmarks: DroidBench and ICC-
Bench.
DroidBench. DroidBench is a set of hand crafted Android
applications for which all leaks are known in advance. These
leaks are used as ground truth to evaluate how well static
and dynamic security tools find data leaks. DroidBench ver-
sion 1.2 contains 64 different test cases with different pri-
vacy leaks. However, all the leaks in DroidBench are intra-
component privacy leaks. Thus, we developed 22 test cases
to extend DroidBench with ICC leaks. The new set of test
cases covers each of the top 8 ICC methods in Table I.
Among the 22 new test case applications, we included four
(startActivity{4,5,6,7}) that do not contain any pri-
vacy leaks and thus will help detect false alarm rates of
analysis tools. Finally, for each test case application we add
an unreachable component containing a sink. These unreach-
able components are used to flag tools that do not properly
construct links between components.
ICC-Bench. ICC-Bench is another set of apps introduced by
Amandroid [44]. It contains 9 test case applications, where one
of them uses explicit Intents, 6 of them use implicit Intents and
the remaining two use dynamic techniques to register the target
component. However, each of the test case applications indeed
contain one ICC leak and do not contain any unreachable
component as DroidBench does. Because the source code
of apps in the ICC-Bench were not available, we could not
evaluate AppScan on this benchmark.
2) ICC Data Leak Test: Table III presents the results for
comparing how related tools perform in the detection of ICC
leaks. All 31 (22 added to DroidBench + 9 from ICC-Bench)
test cases, and the corresponding detection outcome for the
tools are listed in this table.
FlowDroid. Because FlowDroid has already been evaluated
on the first version of DroidBench [7], we present in table III
its test results for the newly added 22 test cases which
are dedicated to ICC leaks. Although, as mentioned earlier,
FlowDroid was initially proposed to detect leaks in single
Android components, we can use FlowDroid in a way that
it computes paths for all individual components and then
combines all these paths together (whether there is a real
link or not). Thus, we expect FlowDroid to detect most of
the leaks, although with false positives. Results of Table III
confirm this, since FlowDroid shows a high recall (70.0%)
and a low precision (27.4%). Furthermore, FlowDroid misses
three more leaks than IccTA in bindService{2,3,4}.
After investigation, we discovered that this is due to the fact
that FlowDroid does not consider some callback methods for
service components.
AppScan Source 9.0. AppScan requires a lot of manual initial-
ization work since it has no default sources/sinks configuration
file and is unable to analyze Android applications without
specifying the entry points of every component. We define
the getDeviceId and log methods, which we always use
in DroidBench for ICC leaks, as source and sink, respectively.
We also add all components’ entry point methods (such as
onCreate for Activities) as callback methods so AppScan
knows where to start the analysis. AppScan is natively un-
able to detect inter-component data-flows and only detects
intra-component flows. AppScan has the same drawbacks as
FlowDroid and should have a high recall and low precision
on DroidBench. We use an additional script to combine the
flows between components. As expected, AppScan’s recall is
high (56.5%) and its precision is low (21.0%). Compared
to FlowDroid, AppScan does worse. Indeed, AppScan does
not correctly handle startActivityForResult and thus
misses leaks going through methods receiving results from the
called Activities in startActivityForResult{2,3,4}
test cases.
DidFail. Since DidFail does not handle explicit ICC, it fails
to report leaks for test cases that use explicit Intents between
components. For implicit ICC, it is able to report all the leaks
for test cases Implicit{1,2,3,4,5,6} even when those
implicit ICCs use advanced features like mimetype or data.
However, DidFail fails on case startActivity{4,5} test
cases indicate that DidFail is not sensitive on mimetype
and data. Our assumption is that DidFail uses an over-
approximation approach to build implicit ICC links. As long
as action and category are matched, an ICC link is con-
structed. Indeed, startActivity{4,5} use mimetype
or data, but do not contain any real ICC link. Because
DidFail currently only focuses on Activity, it fails to
report any leak for the Service, Broadcast Receiver
(dynamically registered or not) and Content Provider
test cases.
Amandroid. Amandroid is the most recent state-of-the-art
tool that is able to detect ICC leaks. Overall, for the 31
test cases, Amandroid reaches a precision of 78.9% (15 true
positives, 4 false positives) and a recall of 51.7% (14 missed
leaks). Three of the missed leaks and two of the false alarmed
leaks are caused by startActivityForResult, where
Amandroid is not able to combine setResult method to
onActivityResult method. The startService2 test
case uses IntentService instead of Service which is
used by test case startService1 to implement the service.
Amandroid is able to report a leak on startService1 but
fails to report a leak on startService2. This indicates that
it does not completely model Service’s lifecycles. When
the callback method changes from onStartCommand to
onHandleIntent, Amandroid is not able to deal with it
anymore. Eight other missed leaks indicate that Amandroid
currently does not handle the bindService method and
Content Provider components. Amandroid reports two
false positives for startActivity{6,7}, which indicates
that it is not able to distinguish the extra keys of an In-
tent. Indeed, startActivity{6,7} do not contain any
leaks because they use different extra keys for the trans-
ferred Intent. Finally, Amandroid misses a leak on test case
DynRegister2 because DynRegister2 uses string op-
erations (e.g., StringBuilder Objects to contact multiple
strings) which Amandroid cannot parse.
IccTA. Our tool, IccTA, also misses a leak on case
DynRegister2 like Amandroid, because, currently, it can-
not parse complicated string operations as well. The same
reason causes IccTA to yield a false positive on case
startActivity7, where one extra key is built through
complicated string operations. The current version of IccTA
performs a simple string analysis to distinguish the extra keys
of an Intent between one another.
IccTA outperforms both the commercial and academic
tools by achieving a precision of 96.6% and a recall of
96.6% on DroidBench and ICC-Bench.
B. RQ2: Experimental Results on Real-World Apps
To evaluate our approach, we launch IccTA on two Android
app sets: 1) MalGenome which contains 1260 Malware apps
and 2) from GooglePlay, with 15,000 randomly selected apps.
For MalGenome, IccTA reports 108 apps (rMalGenome =
8.7%) containing at least one ICC leak, with a total
of 534 leaks. And for GooglePlay, IccTA detects 337
apps (rGoogleP lay = 2.2%) with 2,395 ICC leaks. Since
rMalGenome is significantly higher than rGoogleP lay , we can
conclude that malware indeed use ICC to leak private data. We
further studied the correlations between the number of Intents
and the number of detected ICC leaks for the two data sets.
In this study, only apps that contain ICC leaks are considered.
Interestingly, our results show that there is no correlation for
GooglePlay apps. However, there exists a positive correlation
for MalGenome. The Spearman’s rho for MalGenome yielded
the value 0.42 (p-value < 0.001), suggesting that the malware
do use ICC to leak private data.
In total, IccTA detects 445 (108 + 337) apps from the
MalGenome and GooglePlay sets. We summarize the most
frequently used source methods and sink categories (Java
classes) from those apps in Table IV. The most used source
method is getLongitude: it is used 427 times. The most
used sink category is SharedPreferences: it is used 1188
times. The reason why we study sink category instead of sink
methods is that there are a lot of sink methods belonging to
a same sink category (e.g., Log sink category includes eight
sink methods which save private data to disk).
We further studied the < sourceMethod, sinkCategory >
pairs of the detected leaks. We found that the most frequently
used pair is < getLongitude, SharedPreferences >,
which happened 208 times. For example, in MalGenome,
app com.evilsunflower.farmer obtains its longitude in
class SetPreferences and transfers it into component
PushService, in which the longitude is leaked. It
also frequently happened in GooglePlay such as in app
infire.beautyleg.sexy.girls and ro.an.moneymanagerfree.
Now, we give one case study to describe the detail of a
leak. com.wanpu.shuijinddp (version 11) is an app in which
TABLE IV: The top 5 used source methods and sink categories
Method/Type Counts(#) Detail
Source Methods
getLongitude 427 get longitude
getLatitude 302 get latitude
getDeviceId 289 get IMEI or ESN
getLastKnownLocation 141 get location
getLine1Number 71 get phone no. of line 1
Sink Categories
SharedPreferences 1188 putInt, putString
HTTP 665 execute
Log 301 error or warn
File 38 write(string)
Message 15 sendTextMessage
an ICC leak has been reported by IccTA. It takes the device id
(we consider the device id as sensitive data) as an unique user
id to communicate with a remote server6 via HTTP. It first
reads the device id and stores the id to a private field in class
com.waps.AppConnect. Then, method showOffers of
class AppConnect transfers the device id to component
OffersWebView in which the device id has been sent to
a remote server through a HTTP parameter. In this case, the
device id has been leaked to a specified remote server through
an ICC. Besides, the device id may be captured by hackers
since it only uses HTTP instead of HTTPS to communicate
with the remote server.
Finally, we investigated the total reported leaks and we
found that 1812 out of 2929 (61.9%) leaks are leaked through
Service components. These findings are interesting since
using ICC makes leak detection difficult for analysis tools,
while using Services hides those leaks to the user. Indeed
Service components are running in the background with no
interaction with the user (contrary to Activity components).
We were able to find ICC leaks in a large set of real-
world apps. Correlation studies have further revealed
that malware are indeed using ICC to leak private data.
C. RQ3: Runtime Performance
We present the runtime performance analysis of FlowDroid,
Amandroid and IccTA in Fig. 6. We randomly selected 50 apps
from our Googleplay set for our study. Among those, only
18 apps have been successfully analyzed by all three tools
altogether.
First, we compare the performance between FlowDroid and
IccTA1 to check whether our bytecode instrumentation step
influences the final performance or not. As shown in Fig. 6,
the performance of IccTA1 is almost as good as FlowDroid.
Indeed, an ICC link introduces 50 lines of Jimple code on
average, which is negligible comparing to the total code lines
(e.g., 412,090 lines for 1 megabyte bytecode on average).
Second and finally, we compare the performance between
IccTA2 and Amandroid. In this case, we take into account
the ICC links extraction time for a fair comparison since
Amandroid also builds the ICC links. Fig. 6 shows that the
median values of IccTA and Amandroid are similar. However,
the runtime performance of IccTA2 presents significantly less
variation than Amandroid’s, suggesting that Amandroid is
highly sensitive to different properties (e.g., size) of the app.
6http://app.dwap.com:8000/action/
TABLE III: Test results on DroidBench and ICC-Bench, where multiple circles in one row means multiple leaks expected and an all empty
row means no leaks expected as well as no leaks reported. † indicates the tool crashed on that test case. Because FlowDroid and AppScan
are not able to directly report ICC leaks, we try our best to manually match their results to report ICC leaks. For the rest tools, we only
consider their reported ICC leaks.
⋆ = true positive (correct warning), ⋆ = false positive (false warning), = false negative (missed leak)
Test Case # of C. Unreachable C. Explicit ICC FlowDroid AppScan DidFail Amandroid IccTA
DroidBench
startActivity1 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startActivity2 4 T T ⋆ (4 ⋆ ) ⋆ (4 ⋆ ) ⋆ ⋆
startActivity3 6 T T ⋆ (32 ⋆ ) ⋆ (32 ⋆ ) ⋆ ⋆
startActivity4 3 T F ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startActivity5 3 T F ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startActivity6 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startActivity7 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startActivityForResult1 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startActivityForResult2 3 T T ⋆ ⋆
startActivityForResult3 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startActivityForResult4 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startService1 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
startService2 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
bindService1 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
bindService2 3 T T † ⋆
bindService3 3 T T † ⋆
bindService4 3 T T ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
sendBroadcast1 3 T F ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
insert1 3 T F ⋆
delete1 3 T F ⋆
update1 3 T F ⋆
query1 3 T F ⋆
ICC-Bench
Explicit1 2 F T ⋆ - ⋆ ⋆
Implicit1 2 F F ⋆ - ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
Implicit2 2 F F ⋆ - ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
Implicit3 2 F F ⋆ - ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
Implicit4 2 F F ⋆ - ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
Implicit5 3 F F ⋆ ⋆ - ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
Implicit6 2 F F ⋆ - ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
DynRegister1 2 F F - † ⋆ ⋆
DynRegister2 2 F F - †
Sum, Precision, Recall and F1
⋆ , higher is better - - - 20 10 6 15 28
⋆ , lower is better - - - 53 46 2 4 1
, lower is better - - - 9 10 23 14 1
Precision p = ⋆ /( ⋆ + ⋆) - - - 27.4% 17.9% 75% 78.9% 96.6%
Recall r = ⋆ /( ⋆ + ) - - - 70.0% 50.0% 20.7% 51.7% 96.6%
F1-measure 2pr/(p + r) - - - 0.39 0.26 0.32 0.63 0.97
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Fig. 6: The runtime performance comparison among Amandroid,
FlowDroid and IccTA. IccTA1 does not count the ICC links extraction
time while IccTA2 does. All the experiments are performed with the
default options.
V. LIMITATIONS
At the moment, IccTA resolves reflective calls only if
their arguments are string constants. It is also oblivious to
multi-threading. For native calls, IccTA carries the limita-
tion of FlowDroid. Currently, IccTA does not handle some
rarely used ICC methods such as startActivities
and sendOrderedBroadcastAsUser. IccTA cannot
resolve complicated string operations (e.g., by using
StringBuilder) and the string analysis is within a single
method which may cause false alarms. In Android, inter-app
communication (IAC) shares the same mechanism as ICC.
Thus, our approach is also able to detect IAC leaks (cf. [31]),
but in this paper we do not perform experiments on that. We
experienced that IccTA cannot properly analyze some apps
(too much memory consumption or hangs). Running IccTA
on a big server could significantly decrease the failing rate.
VI. RELATED WORK
As far as we know, IccTA is the first approach to seamlessly
connect Android components through code instrumentation in
order to perform ICC based static taint analysis. By using a
code instrumentation technique [6], the state of the context
and data (e.g., an Intent) is transferred between components.
Amandroid [44] performs an ICC analysis to detect ICC
leaks, and has been developed concurrently with IccTA. Aman-
droid needs to build an Inter-component Data Flow Graph
(ICDFG) and an Data Dependence Graph (DDG) to perform
ICC analysis. Since IccTA uses an instrumentation approach,
it does not need to additionally build such assistant graphs.
Amandroid provides a general framework to enable analysts to
build a customized analysis on Android apps. IccTA provides
a source/sink configuration to achieve the same function.
Amandroid is not able to analyze Content Provider
as well as some ICC methods such as bindService and
startActivityForResult. Finally, our instrumentation
approach is more flexible, and enables generating an app with
all components linked at the code level. This app can then be
analyzed by any static analysis tool (e.g., Soot or Wala [5]).
DidFail [27] also leverages FlowDroid and Epicc to de-
tect ICC leaks. Currently, it focuses on ICC leaks between
Activities through implicit Intents. Thus, it will miss
leaks involving explicit Intents and components other than
Activities. Also, it does not handle some parameters for
implicit Intents (such as mimetype and data) and thus
generates false links between components. The consequence
of that is a higher false positive rate.
SCanDroid [21] and SEFA [45] are another two tools
that perform ICC analysis. However, neither of them keeps
the context between components and thus are less precise
than IccTA by design. ComDroid [14] and Epicc [37] are
two tools that tackle the ICC problem, but mainly focus on
ICC vulnerabilities and do not taint data. CHEX [33] is a
tool to detect component hijacking vulnerabilities in Android
applications by tracking taints between sensitive sources and
externally accessible interfaces. However, it is limited to
at most 1-object-sensitivity which leads to imprecision in
practice. PCLeaks [29] performs data-flow analysis to detect
potential component leaks, which not only includes compo-
nent hijacking vulnerabilities, but also component launch (or
injection) vulnerabilities. ContentScope [50] is another tool
that tackles potential component leaks, but it only analyzes
Content Provider components.
Multiple prior works use static analysis to detect intra-
component privacy leaks in Android apps [7], [22], [26], [35],
[47]. AndroidLeaks [22] and LeakMiner [47] state the ability
to handle the Android lifecycle including callback methods,
but the two tools are not context-sensitive which precludes
the precise analysis of many practical scenarios. However,
those tools are not able to detect ICC leaks. AsDroid [25]
and AppIntent [48] are two other tools using static analysis
to detect privacy leaks in Android apps. Both of them try to
analyze if a data leak is a feature of the application or not.
This kind of analysis is out of the scope of this paper.
Multiple prior works investigated privacy leaks on systems
other than Android. PiOS [16] uses program slicing and reach-
ability analysis to detect the possible privacy leaks in iOS apps.
TAJ [43] and Andromeda [42] uses the same taint analysis
technique to identify privacy leaks in web applications.
Except privacy leaks detection, there has been a rich body
of work on other Android security issues [9], [12], [18],
[20], [23], [51] such as energy bugs [15], [32] and SSL
vulnerabilities [19], [41]. Our work can complement their
research by providing a highly precise control-flow graph to
enable them to perform inter-component data-flow analysis
and consequently to get better results.
Other approaches dynamically track the sensitive data to
report security issues. TaintDroid [17] is one of the most
sophisticated dynamic taint tracking system. TaintDroid uses
a modified Dalvik virtual machine to track flows of private
data. CopperDroid [39] is another dynamic testing tool which
observes interactions between Android components and the
Linux system to reconstruct high-level behavior and uses
some special stimulation techniques to exercise the app to
find malicious activities. Several other systems, including
AppFence [24], Aurasium [46], AppGuard [8] and Better-
Permission [10] try to mitigate the privacy leak problem by
dynamically monitoring the tested apps.
However, those dynamic approaches can be fooled by
specifically designed methods to circumvent security track-
ing [40]. Thus, dynamic tracking approaches may miss
some data leaks and yield an under-approximation. On the
other hand, static analysis approaches may yield an over-
approximation because all the application’s code is analyzed
even code that will never be executed at runtime. These
two approaches are complementary when analyzing Android
applications for data leaks.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the major challenge of performing
data-flow analysis across multiple components for Android
apps. We have presented IccTA, an open source tool, to
perform ICC based taint analysis. In particular, we demonstrate
that IccTA can detect ICC based privacy leaks by providing a
highly precise control-flow graph through instrumentation of
the code of applications. Unlike previous approaches, IccTA
enables a data-flow analysis between two components and
adequately models the lifecycle and callback methods to detect
ICC based privacy leaks. When running IccTA on DroidBench
and ICC-Bench, it reaches a precision of 96.6% and a recall
of 96.6%. When running IccTA on a set of 1,260 apps of
the MalGenome project, it reports 534 ICC leaks in 108
apps (8.6%). When running IccTA on a set of 15,000 real-
world apps randomly selected from Google Play market, it
detects 2,395 ICC leaks in 337 apps (2.2%). Other existing
privacy detecting tools (e.g., AndroidLeaks) could benefit by
implementing our approach to perform ICC based privacy
leaks detection.
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